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Towards Dialogue through a Holistic Measuring Framework 
 – The Impact of Social Media on Risk Communication in the Covid-19  
Abstract 
Design/methodology/approach 
The impact of social media on risk communication is measured by the correlation between 
“speak from power” and “speak to power” levels, where the former primarily spoke to two facets 
of the risk communication process – rapidness and attentiveness, and the latter was benchmarked 
against popularity and commitment. The framework was empirically validated with data relating 
to Covid-19 risk communication in 25,024 selected posts on 17 official provincial Weibo accounts 
in China.  
Purpose  
Despite the huge potential of social media, its functionality and impact for enhanced risk 
communication remain unclear. Drawing on dialogic theory by integrating both “speak from power” 
and “speak to power” measurements, the article proposes a systematic framework to address this 
issue. 
Findings 
The analysis results suggest the relationship between the “speak from power” and “speak to 
power” is mixed rather than causality, which confirms that neither the outcome-centric nor the 
process-centric method alone cannot render a full picture of government–public interconnectivity. 
Besides, the proposed interconnectivity matrix reveals that the two provinces have evidenced the 
formation of government-public mutuality, which provides empirical evidence that dialogic 




Our study proposed a prototype framework that underlines the need that the impact of social 
media on risk communication should and must be assessed through a combination of process and 
outcome, or interconnectivity. We further divide the impact of social media on risk communication 
into dialogue enabler, “speak from power” booster, “speak to power” channel, and mass media 
alternative. 
Keywords: Social media; Risk communication; Dialogic theory, Covid-19 
 
1. Introduction 
Risk communication is the interactive exchange of information, advice, and opinions between 
the government and the public who face a threat, to disseminate situational awareness, recognize 
public actual needs, and enable informed decision-making. Given that emergencies are often 
fraught with uncertainty, confusion, and urgency (DiClemente & Jackson, 2016), it is important 
that during the risk communication, the government officials must be responsive, credible (Tolbert 
& Mossberger, 2006) while also persuading the public to be supportive of rules or regulations and 
stay away from rumor or fake messages, to minimize adverse outcomes. At the height of the 
pandemic, for instance, the failure of proper risk communication of the unprecedented measures 
(e.g., home isolation, city lockdown) introduced in a bid to curb the spread of Covid-19 has caused 
panic distress (e.g., the panic-buying), which may even evolve into societal chaos (Torero, 2020). 
Pearce (2003) observed that appropriate risk communication is the premise of a government’s 
success in disaster management, therefore leading to the necessity to better communicate with the 
public to enable informed decision-making and assuage the psychological impacts (such as stress, 
frustration, dissatisfaction, and feelings of loss of control) caused by information uncertainty and 
asymmetry (Bucher et al., 2013).  
3 
 
Risk communication has been further enhanced by the introduction of social media. In the 
mass media, traditional risk communication is considered as unidirectional information 
dissemination (Agostino & Arnaboldi, 2016). Hand and Ching (2011) referred to this as to “speak 
from power”, whereby members of the public are passive information recipients. Social media is 
believed to boost the “speak from power” capability because its flattened networked structure 
allows information to be updated in a highly prompt manner (Al-Saggaf & Simmons, 2015) and 
makes it accessible to a wide range of audiences (Dabner, 2012), with 1.90 billion users on 
Facebook (Facebook, 2021) and 224 million on Weibo (WeiboCorporation, 2020), for instance. 
Moreover, an increasing number of recent studies (Mergel, 2013; Yan & Pedraza‐Martinez, 2019; 
Zheng & Zheng, 2014) has suggested that social media has the potential to transform the prevailing 
but less desirable risk communication mode of “speak from power” into a “speak to power” 
approach (Hand & Ching, 2011), which helps enhance information transparency with the public 
and formulate a public-to-government feedback loop (Picazo-Vela, Gutiérrez-Martínez, & Luna-
Reyes, 2012), ultimately leading to a desirable outcome of government trust (Wang & Wan Wart, 
2007). All combined, social media is believed to influence risk communication not only in its 
compelling advantage in its boost in “speak from power”, but also the unique “speak to power” 
potential it can bring for risk communication, consequently receiving a wide spectrum of scholarly 
attention in the research community (Feeney & Welch, 2012; Kim, Park, & Rho, 2015; Ma, 2013).  
Despite extensive theoretical studies positing that social media can facilitate interactions in 
terms of “speak to power” (Chen et al., 2020; Wirtz and Zimbres 2018; Das and Dutta 2021), the 
dialogic potential of social media in risk communication has not been fully achieved in practice 
(McAllister-Spooner, 2009; Sommerfeldt & Yang, 2018). A few previous attempts have been made 
by scholars, such as Zheng and Zheng (2014), Ki and Nekmat (2014), Yan (2020), etc. However, 
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the government and the public are two asymmetric entities, and none of these studies covered 
emergencies. The insights, therefore, cannot be readily applied in either asymmetric entities or 
emergencies, calling for immediate response. Further, the difficulty in understanding the dialogic 
potential of social media on risk communication is compounded given that it is not automatically 
fostered from one-off sporadic interactions but substantial back-and-forth interactions, making 
previous studies that based on either “speak from power” or “speak to power” inconclusive 
(Beaunoyer, Dupéré, & Guitton, 2020). Specifically, a genuine dialogue requires investigating how 
“speak from power” and “speak to power” are correlated, thus requiring revisiting of behavior from 
both the public and government sides. A need, therefore, emerges to integrate the two dimensions 
to render the pointers which dialogic-oriented social media can pursue in risk communication with 
the over-arching research question:  
How can integrating both “speak from power” and “speak to power” phases reveal the 
impact of social media on risk communication? 
In this research, we aim to investigate the interconnectivity between government action and 
public response through evaluating the level of “speak from power” and “speak to power” in risk 
communication. Further, an enhanced understanding of interconnectivity is deemed a starting point 
to develop a broader repertoire of strategies to exploit the benefits of social media in risk 
communication (Feeney & Porumbescu, 2020). This study’s contributions are twofold: (1) it 
incorporates “speak from power” and “speak to power” to provide a better understanding of the 
impact of social media on risk communication, further facilitating government’s strategies 
development in risk; and (2) Provides nuanced insights into government-public dialogic 
relationship establishment, giving rise to policy notes on improving government transparency in 
the digital era. 
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The background to this research and 
related literature are presented in Section Two, followed by the introduction of the prototype 
framework and methodology of the study in Section Three and Section Four, respectively. We 
verified and refined the framework with empirical data, set out in Section Five, with the discussion 
found in Section Six. The study concludes with a discussion of its implications in the final section. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Social media’s impact on risk communication 
Communication is generally referred to as the conveyance of messages by means of 
exchanging thoughts, ideas, or information to the masses, the public, or niche audiences (Blumler 
& Gurevitch, 2002; Irwin, 2021). Specific activities undertaken during an emergency situation for 
similar purposes are understood as risk communication (Ju, Ohs, Park, & Hinsley, 2021). To this 
end, activities often involve the exchange of real-time information, advice, and opinions between 
experts and people facing threats to their health or economic or social well-being (DiClemente & 
Jackson, 2016; Şirin & Özkan, 2021). Risk communication mainly focuses on mustering and 
information sharing activity between the government and the public. In addition to many other 
communication methods (e.g., face-to-face, telephone, commercial radio, commercial television) 
(Lindell & Perry, 1992), this study mainly focuses on risk communication on social media, such 
as Facebook, Twitter, and Weibo. 
Social media has been exploited as a prevailing platform for communication because it 
supports wide information accessibility (Dabner, 2012), timely information updates (Al-Saggaf & 
Simmons, 2015), and interactions among users (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006). First, the 
information accessibility of social media is highlighted in numerous studies (Borrino, Furini, & 
Roccetti, 2009; Dabner, 2012; Tajudeen, Jaafar, & Sulaiman, 2016). In general, social media sites 
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are prone to facilitating the spread of information to their audiences, which can have a positive 
impact on information accessibility (Tajudeen et al., 2016). Particularly for disadvantaged groups, 
such as the disabled and seniors, social media enables users to access, perceive, and understand 
information (Borrino et al., 2009). Second, social media provides an “always-on” environment for 
information exchange (Xu, Kang, Song, & Clarke, 2015), making instant communication possible 
(Bekkers, Edwards, Moody, & Beunders, 2011). Meanwhile, its flattened networked structure 
allows information to be updated in a highly prompt manner (Al-Saggaf & Simmons, 2015). As 
far as emergencies are concerned, underneath the descriptive advantages that social media has to 
offer, the extensive literature on risk communication through social media documents cases 
involves, for example, identification of missing people (Palen & Liu, 2007) and mapping of 
hazards and risks (Pourebrahim, Sultana, Edwards, Gochanour, & Mohanty, 2019). Social media 
has thus been extensively utilized in various situations relating to natural hazards and human-
induced disasters, establishing itself as a resourceful risk communication channel (Silver & 
Matthews, 2017). 
In addition, social media is identified with the key strength of triggering interaction between 
corresponding parties at a relatively low cost. Scholars (e.g., Bélanger and Carter, 2008; Welch et 
al., 2005; West, 2004) agree that social media is a cornerstone for public-driven information and 
service and speedy and convenient interactions. For instance, Warren, Sulaiman, and Jaafar (2014) 
asserted that social media has re-defined communication, providing its audience with the 
opportunity to spread social causes and participate in digital activism on various issues. Such an 
approach supports Mergel (2013) assertion that social media represents an effective way to attract 
the audience to engage, interact, and collaborate. Bertot et al. (2012) took a step further, identifying 
four key areas where social media exerts impact – collaboration, participation, empowerment, and 
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real-time interaction. A similar study was undertaken by Medaglia and Zheng (2017), who argued 
that social media has increased communication in terms of responsiveness, information delivery, 
and service provision. Particularly during disasters, many scholars believed that risk 
communication can leverage social media as an enhanced interactive communication. Recognizing 
its merits, numerous studies are investigating government–public interactions in response to 
natural disasters (Lovari & Bowen, 2019) as well as the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic (Liao et al., 
2020). 
In all, empowered by information technology, the participatory communication structure 
(Alvarez & Hall, 2003) is believed to have the potential to encourage government-public 
interactions (Ksiazek, Peer, & Lessard, 2016), but evidence on such interactions remains piecemeal 
and inconclusive. Thus, it is necessary to revisit the literature on the evaluation of the government-
public interactions. 
2.2 Evaluation of government–public interconnectivity 
To better understand government–public interactions, Rowe and Frewer (2000) took the first 
step, introducing a prototype framework to measure public activity in communication in terms of 
public participation. They re-categorized public activity into two levels – public communication 
and public participation. While public communication refers to a one-way “speak from power” 
information flow, public participation is characterized by “speak to power” public feedback. There 
are different derivatives of this classic formulation, such as that of Lee and Kwak (2012), who 
extend the evaluation framework to more levels, such as transparency, participation, and 
collaboration. These studies examine interactions between government and public participation 
through perceptions of administrative experts (Wang & Wan Wart, 2007) rather than the real public. 
To address this limitation, other scholarship leverages stakeholder theory (Bonsón & Ratkai, 2013) 
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to include the public as survey respondents. Welch, Hinnant, and Moon (2005) explored the 
interactions between the government and the public on websites using surveys from internet users. 
Tolbert and Mossberger (2006) adopted a similar approach to investigate the responsiveness and 
accessibility of government through a telephone survey of 815 government website users. 
However, Haro-de-Rosario, Sáez-Martín, and del Carmen Caba-Pérez (2018) argued that the 
questionnaire-based method is based on surveyors’ perceptions, suggesting that interactions 
between government and citizens are not directly examined. Instead, social media platforms such 
as Facebook, Twitter, and Weibo (Agostino & Arnaboldi, 2016; Bonsón & Ratkai, 2013; Gerlitz 
& Helmond, 2013; Pérez, Bolívar, & Hernández, 2012) have profiles (enabling users to, for 
example, like, share, and comment) that can directly reflect public activity levels on social media 
(Agostino & Arnaboldi, 2016; Bonsón & Ratkai, 2013; Haro-de-Rosario et al., 2018), which is 
more objective.  
Further, most of the studies discussed here treat communication as a two-step procedure – 
“speak from power” as the process and “speak to power” as the outcome (Agostino & Arnaboldi, 
2016; Bonsón & Ratkai, 2013; Haro-de-Rosario et al., 2018). However, in a broader context, 
dialogic relationship establishment, rather than “speak to power”, is the ultimate goal for 
communication (Bertot, Jaeger, & Hansen, 2012; Zavattaro & Sementelli, 2014). This is because 
the government can treat “speak to power” as a starting point for soliciting public feedback, 
recognizing actual needs, and embrace the public in disaster management (Bovaird, 2007) rather 
than treating it as an end. As such, the full potential of social media in communication is more than 
a one-off interaction, instead involving substantial back-and-forth “speak from power” and “speak 
to power” interactions to establish interconnectivity. This is deemed to foster greater government 
accountability, transparency, and responsiveness (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006). Further, the 
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relationship between “speak from power” (process) and “speak to power” (outcome) is more 
complex than causality, making the findings of outcome-centric studies fragmented and 
inconclusive. To this end, integrating “speak from power” (process) and “speak to power” 
(outcome) could provide more nuanced insights into their interconnectivity, thus providing more 
holistic findings relating to the contribution of social media to government–public 
interconnectivity. 
3. Evaluation framework 
3.1 Theoretic background 
Dialogic theory, first proposed by Buber (1923) in the book I and Thou in 1923, is primarily 
concerned with the attitudes held by each communication partner in interactive settings. In his 
view, a genuine dialogue sees communication parties in an equal “I-and-you” relationship (I–Thou) 
rather than a skewed “I-to-object” (I–it) relationship. Buber aimed for cooperative communication, 
where openness, honesty, and respect are centered in the “I–Thou” relationship (Agozzino, 2015). 
Dialogue is the core concept derived from dialogic theory, which is defined as a product of 
negotiated discussion with inter-subjectivity: it does not mean agreement, but rather an openness, 
respect, and willingness to reach mutually satisfying positions (Kent & Taylor, 1998). As a result 
of its flexibility and applicability, scholars have extensively discussed dialogic theory and utilized 
it as a theoretical foundation that exploits communication strategically to facilitate interpersonal 
and organization–individual communications such as the work by Rogers (1957), Noddings (1986), 
and Pearson (1990).  
In the context of social media, the dialogic theory provides an important theoretical 
foundation to explain why it might elevate communication. Social media is believed to provide a 
new frontier for innovation in creating a real-time dialogue between organizations and the public. 
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Kent and Taylor (1998) led the efforts to situate dialogue digitally. Their research aimed to provide 
a theoretical framework to enhance organization–public dialogic relationships through the World 
Wide Web. The authors proposed a framework comprising five principal strategies (the dialogic 
loop, usefulness of information, generation of return visits, intuitiveness/ease of interface, and 
conservation of visitors) to enable scholars to gauge the extent of dialogic communication. In a 
later study, Kent and Taylor (2002) further developed five over-arching tenets (mutuality, 
propinquity, empathy, risk, commitment, and interpretation) that encompass the implicit and 
explicit assumptions underlying the concept of dialogue. The dialogic principles have been applied 
to research exploring organizational types such as universities (Gordon & Berhow, 2009), 
commercial companies (Rybalko & Seltzer, 2010), and non-government organizations (Inauen, 
Schoeneborn, & Scherer, 2011).  
As initially conceived, with the help of social media in fostering a sense of connectedness 
amongst and between citizenry and government to build dialogic relationships (Bertot et al., 2012), 
social media platforms, such as Twitter and Weibo, assist governments in increasing capacity for 
communication (Zavattaro & Sementelli, 2014). Nevertheless, empirical evidence on the dialogue, 
especially for handling the power imbalance between government and the public remains scant 
(McAllister-Spooner, 2009; Sommerfeldt & Yang, 2018). 
The dialogic relationship or interconnectivity does not form automatically either in social 
media or during risk communication. If the governments merely treat “speak from power” as the 
means for information dissemination for the emergency response or the citizens treat the “speak to 
power” as an outlet of voicing their fears, no dialogue would be established. Instead, true 
connectivity requires the generation of return visits (Kent & Taylor, 2002) or mutuality (Kent & 
Taylor, 2002) that is not fostered through one-off sporadic interactions but substantial back-and-
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forth ones. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the existence of such substantial interactions 
through integrating speak from power” and “speak to power”.  
3.2 Evaluation Framework 
We integrated “speak from power” and “speak to power” (Figure 1) to verify the existence 
of government-public dialogue and to provide nuanced insights into the social media based risk 
communication. 
 
Figure 1 Measuring the government-public interconnectivity through integrating 
“speak from power” and “Speak to power” 
3.3 Speak to power 
According to Kent and Taylor (1998), dialogue rests on a willingness to the conversation and 
the “speak to power” metric is designed to quantify the willingness from the public side in the risk 
communication. According to the dialogic theory, dialogue requires the generation of return visits 
(Kent & Taylor, 1998) and mutuality (Kent & Taylor, 2002). Publics’ frequent visits can be deemed 
as a proxy indicating the information provided is useful, timely, and demanding, whereas their 
intention to “voice” can be deemed a benchmark if a comfortable or satisfying position is reached 
(Kent & Taylor, 2002). Therefore, we adopted Popularity and Commitment from Agostino and 
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Arnaboldi (2016) to quantify the users' activity in social media. Particularly in risk communication, 
Popularity is adopted to measure the level of the public’s frequent involvement in the risk 
communication, which is the starting point of government-public dialogue. Commitment is adopted 
to measure the extent to which the public feels comfortable in the risk communication and voice 
their opinions and feelings. 
3.4 Speak from power 
Speak from power is designed to measure the willingness of the government to dialogue with 
the public. For the government, in risk communication, information dissemination is not the 
ultimate goal for risk communication, but providing useful, timely, and demanding information 
can be a gesture of being responsible, creditable, and treating the public in a mutual position (Kent 
& Taylor, 1998). A responsible government in risk communication can be reflected by how fast 
and how many resources they put to respond. In the context of social media, based on the literature 
examined, Speak from power is measured by two dimensions, where rapidness (Shan, Wang, Li, 
& Chen, 2012) measures the former and the attentiveness (Rishika, Kumar, Janakiraman, & 
Bezawada, 2013) relates to the later. 
As a sign of willingness to dialogue with the public, Rapidness, adopting from Shan et al. 
(2012), measures the speed quality of governmental action in the risk communication. Two 
dimensions of rapidness are considered, namely sensitivity, and positivity. Sensitivity, adopted 
from Snyder and Kelly (1977), is defined in this context as the proficiency with which the 
government can identify, perceive, and understand cues and contexts in an emergency and initiate 
dialogue with the public. Positivity, adopted from Mondak (1995), describes the state of 
governmental positive involvement in risk communication.  
Attentiveness reflects the extent to how the government being responsible in risk 
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communication. According to Kavanaugh et al. (2012), the government’s responsibility can be 
identified as their behaviors in social media activity such as content preference and spikes. Thus, 
we further formulate two measurement dimensions. Activity reflects the government’s preference 
for engaging with social media for risk communication, including the release of routine 
information and crisis information (Kavanaugh et al., 2012). Intensity, on the other hand, describes 
the extent to which the government is dedicated to important events (such as Covid-19, in this case) 
(Machmud, Irawan, Karinda, & Susilo, 2021). 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Data acquisition 
Alongside other popular leading social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, Weibo 
is one of the most influential social media providers in China, with 550 million monthly active 
users (WeiboCorporation, 2020), making it an appropriate candidate for understanding the impact 
of social media on risk communication, specifically in the Chinese context. The proposed 
framework is validated using the Weibo data in this study but is also deemed applicable for other 
social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. 
The Weibo data was collected from the Sina Weibo Application Programming Interface (API). 
Using the API, we were able to collect Weibo posts from a user’s timeline, which refers to a list of 
Weibo posts by a specific user. For each post on Weibo, attributes such as ID, Text, URL, Location, 
Date, Like, Comment, Share, Topic, and @User were retrieved and saved.  
4.2 Eligible criteria 
In this study, we organized the research with a specific focus on Weibo accounts that are 
officially operated by the information office of each provincial administrative unit. Practically, 
these official accounts act as proxies for risk communication initiatives by provincial governments 
in China. Notably, we ruled out official Weibo accounts operated by other government-owned 
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agencies such as the People’s Daily (operated by the People’s Daily, an official newspaper of the 
central committee of the Communist Party of China) and China Daily (operated by China Daily, 
owned by the publicity department of the Communist Party of China rather than provincial units). 
We believe that their information release strategies differ significantly from the approaches 
examined here, as they are professional media outlets. 
4.3 Content analysis of crisis relevance 
While various messages were publicized through their Weibo accounts, this study only 
selected posts with contents directly pertaining to the specific event in question (Covid-19). Thus, 
as soon as the raw data was collected, we deployed SpaCy (Honnibal & Montani, 2017) to identify 
event-related posts. SpaCy is an open-source library for advanced natural language processing, 
which supports Chinese and is therefore deemed appropriate for Chinese content analysis. The 
processing consisted of two main phases: pre-processing and training.  
The pre-processing step aims to construct a high-frequency event corpus. For each Weibo 
post, the content is inputted for a series of three processing tasks – tokenization, part-of-speech 
tagging, and named entity recognition. The long sentences in each post were segmented into tokens 
and we then aggregated the tokens from all the posts as a corpus and ranked them according to 
their frequency. After the corpus was constructed, we reviewed the top 50 tokens and filtered out 
those not directly relevant to the event.  
In the training phase, the training datasets are annotated manually based on whether or not 
they contained tokens in the high-frequency event corpus. Specifically, posts containing tokens in 
the high-frequency event corpus were annotated as 1 while others were annotated as 0. The training 
datasets were subsequently inputted into a gradient loss-based prediction model in SpaCy. The 
training was an iterative process as part of which the model’s predictions were compared against 
the reference annotations to estimate the gradient of the loss. The gradient of the loss was then 
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used to calculate the gradient of the weights by means of backpropagation. After all the iterations, 
we saved the final model as the updated model for the evaluation datasets (sample scope). For the 
content analysis, we use the random sampling method to select 10% of datasets as the training 
dataset. The final high-frequency Covid-19 corpus is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 Lists of high-frequency Covid-19 corpus 
Category Tokens in Chinese （English meaning） 
Disease name 
 新型肺炎(new pneumonia), 新型冠状(new coronavirus),新冠(coronavirus),冠
状病毒 (coronavirus), 肺炎(pneumonia), Covid-19, Covid19, 病毒性肺炎 (viral 




人传人(human-to-human transmission), 潜伏期 (incubation), 超级传播者 (super 
spreader), 密切接触者 (close contact), 发病 (morbidity), 输入性病例 (imported 
case), 疫情 (epidemic),发热病人 (patient with fever), 核酸检测 (nucleic acid 
testing), 口罩紧缺(mask shortage), 防护服紧缺(protective clothing shortage; 酒
精紧缺(shortage of disinfectant alcohol ), N95紧缺 (N95 mask shortage), 防护面
罩紧缺(protective mask shortage), 护目镜紧缺（goggles shortage), 床位紧缺
（shortage of hospital beds). 
Policy 
initiatives 
封城 (city lockdown), 隔离(quarantine), 居家(stay-at-home order), 社交距离
(social distancing), 应急医院 (makeshift hospital), 突发公共卫生事件 (public 
health emergency), 聚集 (mass gatherings), 两周观察期 (two-week observation 
period). 
4.4 Outcome and process measurement 
To better understand the interconnectivity between the government and the public in social 
media during the risk communication, measuring the process and outcome is a premise. As such, 
the metric is developed (Table 2). 
For the outcome measurement, from different evaluation metrics (Agostino & Arnaboldi, 
2016; Bonsón & Ratkai, 2013; Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013; Pérez et al., 2012), we adopted a metric 
developed by Agostino and Arnaboldi (2016). Specifically, popularity is determined using the ratio 
between “total likes” per post and the total number of followers of the Weibo account. Commitment, 
on the other hand, is determined by the ratio of combined “total shares” and “total comments” per 
post and the total number of followers of the Weibo account.  
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Description Notation Metrics used for Weibo 
Process: Rapidness of response 
 Sensitivity 
Describes the proficiency 
with which government-
owned social media 
platforms can identify, 
perceive, and understand 
cues and contexts in an 
emergency. 
𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 
The inverse of the duration between the first 
routine post and the first event post. In this 
study, according to SCIO, Covid-19 was 





Describes a state of positive 




The inverse of the duration between the 
first event post and the first time the event-
relevant post ratio reaches a threshold 𝛿 – 
in this study we set the threshold at 0.50. 
1
𝑇(𝜌𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ≥ 𝛿) − 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 1
 
Process: Attentiveness of response 
 Activity  
Describes the actions of a 
Weibo account relating to 
risk communication, 
including daily information 
and crisis information. 
𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 
The average number of daily posts since 
the first event post was released. 
 Intensity 
Describes the degree to 
which the Weibo account is 
dedicated to risk 
communication. 
𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦  




Outcome: Public activity  
 Popularity 
Effectiveness of risk 
communication in attracting 
public attention to Weibo. 
𝑂𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 ∙ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠
× 106 
 Commitment 
Effectiveness of risk 
communication in initiating 
public feedback. 
𝑂𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 ∙ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠
× 106 
For the process measurement, based on the literature examined, no well-established 
measurement metrics address our special context, meaning that an operable measurement metric 
was further developed. In the process rapidness, sensitivity is computed as the inverse of the 
duration between the first routine post and the first event post, where the event relevance is 
determined using the machine learning method already described in the methodology section. On 
the other hand, the term positivity is computed as the inverse of the duration between the first event 
post and the first time an event-relevant post ratio reaches a threshold 𝛿. In this study we set the 
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threshold at 0.50, indicating that the number of event posts exceeds the number of routine posts. 
For the process attentiveness, based on the work of Kavanaugh et al. (2012), activity is computed 
as the average number of daily posts since the first event post was released, while intensity is 
measured as the ratio of event posts to all posts. 
5. Results 
5.1 Background 
Covid-19 has ravaged the globe on an unprecedented scale. Along with other countries 
affected by the pandemic, China has been working around the clock in a resolute battle to curb the 
spread of the disease and prevent it from re-surging. Specifically, in China, Covid-19 was first 
officially identified by the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission on December 31, 2019 (NRP.org, 
2020b), which was selected as the starting date of the investigation. No new confirmed cases were 
first reported in Hubei on March 18, the worst-hit area in China, which was correspondingly 
selected as the end date for the data collection (Nature, 2020). 
Applying inter-rater policy, each author conducted a preliminary search on their own and 
concluded that 20 of the 34 provincial administrative units in China so far have registered an 
official Weibo account for information release (Table 3). We removed the Hebei, Hunan, and 
Sichuan accounts and retained the remaining 17 as the focal sample because the posts from these 
three accounts did not cover the entire research window from the official declaration of the 
outbreak on January 21 to the downgrading of the emergency response in each province. The 
detailed demographics and characteristics of each province are provided in Appendix 1. 
Table 3 Scope of the study 









Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, 
Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Shandong, Qinghai, 
Guangdong, Guizhou, Zhejiang, Xinjiang 
Hebei**, Hunan**, Liaoning, 
Shaanxi, Anhui, Hainan, Fujian, 
Taiwan, Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan**, 
Tibet, Ningxia, Guangxi, Inner 
Mongolia, Hong Kong, Macau 
Note: * The social media accounts selected for analysis in this study are Weibo accounts, which are officially operated 
by the Information Office of the government in each provincial administrative unit, respectively. 
**Hebei, Hunan, and Sichuan do have official Weibo accounts, but none of these posts information covers the entire 
epidemic period, and therefore these accounts are not included in this study.  
5.2 Results: Descriptive statistics 
Figure 2 depicted the daily number of posts, likes per post, shares per post, and comments per 
post for all 17 sample provincial administrative Weibo accounts. Comparing the data before and 
after January 20, when the human-to-human transmission was first announced in China, we found 
that the average number of daily posts remained static before January 20. However, this 
significantly increased from 240.21 to 320.05 – a 33.24% increased ratio. Similarly, the average 
number of daily likes, shares, and comments increased by 337%, 1204%, and 258%, respectively. 
A significant decline then took place in the daily number of posts alongside a reverse jump in the 
number of likes per post, shares per post, and comments per post from January 20 to January 25. 
During this period, all levels of provincial government took immediate measures. On January 20, 
President Xi Jinping ordered “resolute efforts” to curb the spread of the novel coronavirus that 
caused cases of pneumonia (XinhuaNet, 2020b). On January 23, Wuhan city was sealed (NRP.org, 
2020a), when three provinces first announced a Level 1 emergency response. By January 25, 30 
of the 34 provincial governments joined the response (XinhuaNet, 2020a), all taking a strict stance 
regarding Weibo posts and carefully reviewing the messages being circulated. Moreover, the daily 
number of posts bounced back on January 26 and then gradually increased. In the meantime, the 
number of likes, shares, and comments per post decreased. The second peak in the number of likes, 
shares, and comments per post occurred on January 31, the date after the World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared coronavirus “a public health emergency of international concern” 




Figure 2 Statistics for 17 provincial governments and their engagement of the public 
through Weibo 
Table 4 summarizes the preliminary results of both process and outcome, based on the 
proposed framework of the 17 provinces. It implies a connection between government information 
release on social media and public attention on the epidemic, as the Weibo accounts with relatively 
high levels of popularity and commitment are more likely to perform better in rapidness and 
attentiveness. Aside from this connection, however, it does not provide more nuanced insights. For 
instance, the preliminary result does not fully capture a picture of whether the increase in risk 
communication activity or intensity (process) would lead to an increase in public activity (outcome) 
or extend the relationship between them. More importantly, some inverse and asynchronous trends 
stemming from the period, as depicted in Figure 2, remain unclear and perplexing. For instance, 
the decrease in risk communication activities on social media during the period from January 20 
to January 25 surprisingly witnessed the first peak in public activity, while the latter increase in 
20 
 
risk communication activities after February 11 took place alongside an increase in public 
participation activities. This contradictory scenario reinforces the importance of understanding the 
interconnectivity between the government and the public – we set out further quantities and 
methods below: 
Table 4 Measures of process and outcome 
Province 
Process rapidness  Process attentiveness  Outcome 
𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑇(𝜌𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ≥ 0.5)  𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦   𝑂𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑂𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
Beijing Jan-20 4  11.81 0.49  28.04 7.56 
Tianjin Jan-20 5  13.34 0.27  53.25 21.71 
Shanghai Jan-20 4  7.15 0.37  180.20 48.54 
Chongqing Jan-20 3  10.05 0.47  290.69 69.05 
Henan Feb-13 1  1.22 0.63  1.07 1.08 
Hubei Jan-3 21  9.51 0.47  12.06 9.54 
Jiangsu Jan-20 4  6.21 0.34  13.14 6.79 
Jiangxi Jan-21 3  15.22 0.42  134.03 34.78 
Jilin Jan-21 0  2.64 0.33  271.75 85.03 
Heilongjiang Jan-18 0  8.53 0.55  110.35 41.34 
Shanxi Jan-20 7  11.10 0.39  461.47 116.77 
Shandong Jan-24 0  6.14 0.37  17.35 3.72 
Qinghai Jan-22 2  2.21 0.51  36.75 13.10 
Guangdong Jan-20 0  1.86 0.84  91.86 28.41 
Guizhou Jan-29 0  1.29 0.72  122.81 39.95 
Zhejiang Jan-20 6  3.40 0.40  208.29 66.38 
Xinjiang Jan-20 65  4.58 0.19  15.37 1.18 
5.2 Public activity outcome matrix 
We adopted the social media engagement matrix proposed by Agostino and Arnaboldi (2016) 
to benchmark public activity on social media, as depicted in Figure 3. Four quadrants were defined 
by popularity and commitment, obtained from the Weibo data. Popularity describes the 
performance of one-way information dissemination from the government to citizens and is plotted 
on the X-axis, while two-way invective public activity level, expressed by commitment, is on the 
Y-axis. By positioning the mean values of both popularity and commitment as the reference value, 
four quadrants – leaders, engagers, ghosts, and chatterboxes – are identified to describe the 




Figure 3 The outcome matrix  
Leaders, in the top-right quadrant, are provincial Weibo accounts with high levels of 
popularity and commitment. This implies that information disseminated in these accounts has not 
only attracted the public’s attention (indicated by likes) but also addressed their concerns and 
triggered their intentions to voice their opinions (indicated by shares and comments). This is the 
highest level of public feedback. Particularly during an emergency, shares and comments on social 
media are important channels through which emergency managers can solicit feedback.  
Engagers, in the top-left quadrant, are provincial Weibo accounts with high levels of 
commitment, but low levels of popularity. This means that these provincial governments have 
established a certain level of information interaction with their followers – however, their follower 
numbers are limited. Ideally, engagers can improve their popularity by increasing activity. The 
biggest concern is whether social stratification exists among these followers as information release 
should not be discriminated against. If the followers only represent a small division of the target 
group in the hierarchy, the government also fails to support full risk communication. 
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Chatterboxes, in the bottom-right quadrant of the matrix, represent Weibo accounts with high 
levels of popularity but low levels of commitment. This means that these provincial Weibo 
accounts have already attracted a considerable amount of public attention, but the information 
released is prone to be irrelevant to public concerns or non-interactive – dialogues between citizens 
and the government have not yet been formed. 
Ghosts, in the bottom-left quadrant, are provincial accounts with low levels of both popularity 
and commitment. This implies that the public may not be aware of these accounts and they may 
therefore fail to trigger public feedback. As such, the value of social media is not exploited.  
In contrast to the previous application (Agostino & Arnaboldi, 2016), in a non-crisis scenario, 
where the provinces are more evenly distributed in the four quadrants of the engagement matrix, 
this research indicates that those provinces are primarily located within two quadrants (Leaders, 
Ghosts) for risk communication. This suggests a distinctive difference between the nature of 
routine communication and risk communication, reinforcing the notion that existing studies of 
routine communication must be extended to shed further light on emergency situations. 
Further, in comparing this work with the research of Agostino and Arnaboldi (2016), Figure 
3 implies a stronger correlation between popularity and commitment, suggesting an increased 
popularity-to-commitment conversion and further highlighting the importance of dialogic theory, 
which explores interconnectivity between the public and the government by understanding the 
behavior of both parties. Nevertheless, the outcome matrix (reflective of public behavior) alone 
fails to address specific governmental actions and strategies for risk communication, potentially 
leading to an increase in popularity-to-commitment conversion. We thus introduced the process 
measurement to address the two issues. 
5.3 The rapidness matrix 
The rapidness matrix represents the speed quality of governmental action on social media for 
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risk communication. The matrix (Figure 4) is composed of four quadrants defined by response 
sensitivity and response positivity. The description and computation metrics for rapidness, 
sensitivity, and positivity are depicted in the methodology section and Table 2, respectively. 
Sensitivity is plotted on the X-axis and positivity is plotted on the Y-axis. By positioning the mean 
values of both dimensions, the four quadrants were identified, corresponding to the speed quality 
of the response of each administrative unit. 
Passive follower, in the bottom-left quadrant, is a province with low levels of both sensitivity 
and positivity. This implies that these provinces have a lagging awareness of the crisis and are 
unable to take proactive measures on social media for risk communication. No province was 
located in this quadrant. 
Active follower, in the bottom-right of the response matrix, is a province with a high level of 
sensitivity but a low level of positivity. This implies that these provinces have quickly perceived 
and responded to emergency situations. However, if, for example, they are affected comparatively 
less, or to prevent unnecessary panic, they are less positively involved in social media for risk 
communication. Four provinces (e.g., Qinghai, Guizhou) sit in this quadrant. 
Active responder, in the top-right quadrant, is a provincial Weibo account with high levels of 
both sensitivity and positivity. This means that, in relation to risk communication, these provincial 
governments are not only sensitive to but also actively engaged in posting Covid-19-related 
information to inform citizens and engage them in emergency response activity using social media. 
From the analysis, ten provinces were attributed to this quadrant, including the most economically 




Figure 4 Process Rapidness Matrix 
Passive responder, in the bottom-right quadrant, is a province with a high level of sensitivity 
but a low level of positivity. This means that although these governments are not sensitive they are 
active on social media for risk communication. Hubei, the province most affected by the pandemic, 
and Xinjiang, fell into this category. Particularly for Hubei, as a result of the nascent nature of 
Covid-19, there was much uncertainty in the first instance, and the local government took a prudent 
stance in the hope of providing information that was as accurate as possible. As a result, Hubei 
could choose to be stringent in circulating confirmed information rather than putting out excessive 
communications. However, as the epidemic developed, the government progressively grasped 
more details relating to Covid-19 and started to become active in informing the public of the 
potential health risks and recommended countermeasures to ensure government transparency.  
5.4 The attentiveness matrix 
Attentiveness represents governmental actions showing that they are paying attention to 
Covid-19. The attentiveness matrix (Figure 5) is composed of four quadrants defined by overall 
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post activity and Covid-19-related post intensity. The description and computation metrics for 
attentiveness, activity, and intensity are depicted in the methodology section and Table 2. Activity 
is plotted on the X-axis and intensity is plotted on the Y-axis. By positioning the mean values of 
both dimensions, the four quadrants corresponding to the extent of governmental involvement on 
social media for risk communication were identified. 
 
Figure 5 The Attentiveness Matrix 
Intensive infrequent posting, in the top-left quadrant, refers to a low level of social media 
activity but a high level of crisis response intensity. This implies that social media is not employed 
in these provinces for routine communication, but for crisis response. For instance, Guangdong 
released only a couple of posts daily, in which the epidemic data was updated.  
Prudent infrequent posting, in the bottom-left quadrant, refers to low levels of both activity 
and crisis response intensity. This implies that social media is not fully exploited for routine 
communication or crisis response.  
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Intensive frequent posting, in the top-right quadrant, refers to high levels of both activity and 
crisis response intensity. This means that social media in these provinces is exploited because these 
provinces intensively focus on specific events while maintaining routine communication activity. 
Four provinces are located in this quadrant. For instance, Beijing is the capital as much more 
attention was given to this city, and Hubei, the most heavily hit area, was constantly under the 
spotlight. By increasing the amount and diversity of information, these provinces, therefore, aimed 
to improve the transparency of their crisis information to engage the public more and attract more 
responses. 
Prudent frequent posting, in the bottom-right quadrant, refers to a high level of activity but a 
low level of crisis response intensity. This suggests that, for such provinces, social media is 
employed more for routine communication. One explanation for provinces adopting this strategy 
is that they have been lightly hit but are on the potential path of epidemic spread: Shanghai and 
Tianjin are two major destinations for the working population from Hubei while Chongqing and 
Jiangxi are adjacent to Hubei. To reduce unnecessary panic and anxiety in the public sphere, these 
provinces are prone to deliberately increasing the amount of risk communication on panic release, 
emotional motivation, and encouragement. 
5.5 Government-Public interconnectivity 
To better derive the government-public interconnectivity, the three matrices – response 
rapidness, response attentiveness, and the public activity matrix were aligned (Table 5) to provide 
first observes on how to deploy interconnectivity between the process and the outcome to 
understand the impact of social media on risk communication. The “Speak from power” process 
level is plotted on X-axis and the “speak to power” outcome level is plotted on Y-axis. By 
positioning the high and low levels of both dimensions, the four quadrants corresponding to the 
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impact of social media for risk communication were identified as depicted in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 The Interconnectivity Matrix 
Dialogue enabler, in the top-right quadrant, refers to high levels in both dimensions. This 
implies that social media has been fully exploited to extend accessibility and empower the public 
to voice during emergencies. Chongqing and Heilongjiang are located in this quadrant. 
“Speak form power” booster, in the bottom-right quadrant, refers to a high level in “speak 
from power” but a low level in “speak to power”. This suggested that the social media in these 
provinces are mainly deployed to boost information dissemination rather than solicit public 
feedback. Beijing and Tianjin are located in this quadrant.  
“Speak to power” channel, in the top-left quadrant, refer to a low level in “speak from power” 
but a high level in “speak to power”. This indicates that though the dialogic relationship has not 
yet formed in social media, these provinces are concerned about collecting public needs. Seven 
provinces are located in this quadrant.  
Mass media alterative, in the bottom-left quadrant, refers to low levels in both dimensions. 
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This reveals that the potential of social media in risk communication is not fully exploited. Six 
provinces are located in this quadrant. 











Beijing Ghosts Active responder Intensive frequent posting 
Tianjin Ghosts Active responder Prudent frequent posting 
Shanghai Leaders Active responder Prudent frequent posting 
Chongqing Leaders Active responder Intensive frequent posting 
Henan Ghosts Active follower Intensive infrequent posting 
Hubei Ghosts Passive responder Intensive frequent posting 
Jiangsu Ghosts Active responder Prudent infrequent posting 
Jiangxi Leaders Active responder Prudent frequent posting 
Jilin Leaders Active responder Prudent infrequent posting 
Heilongjiang Leaders Active responder Intensive frequent posting 
Shanxi Leaders Passive responder Prudent frequent posting 
Shandong Ghosts Active follower Prudent infrequent posting 
Qinghai Ghosts Active responder Intensive infrequent posting 
Guangdong Leaders  Active responder Intensive infrequent posting 
Guizhou Leaders Active follower Intensive infrequent posting 
Zhejiang Leaders Active responder Prudent infrequent posting 
Xinjiang Ghosts Passive responder Prudent infrequent posting 
6. Discussion 
The analytics offers a prototype observation of how to integrate the “speak from power” 
process with the “speak to power” outcome to understand the impact of social media on risk 
communication. Several findings from our analysis are worth noting.  
The analysis results confirm that neither the outcome-centric nor the process-centric method 
alone cannot render a full picture of government–public interconnectivity during risk 
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communication, which further corroborates our research motivation. Previous research (Agostino 
& Arnaboldi, 2016; Bonsón & Ratkai, 2013; Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013; Pérez et al., 2012; Snead, 
2013) posited that measurement of the government’s performance can be achieved through the 
investigation of public activity. However, our first-hand evidence, based on real cases, contradicts 
this argument. For instance, Henan and Shanxi are both identified as Ghosts using the outcome-
centric measurement but have opposite measurements in the process indicators. Henan is identified 
as an active follower in response rapidness and intensive infrequent posting in response 
attentiveness, while Shanxi is identified as a passive responder in response rapidness and prudent 
frequent posting in response attentiveness. The outcome cannot, therefore, be simplified as the 
mirror of the process but should be treated as a barometer of the cumulative influences of the 
process. Similarly, this also implies that the process-centric only method does not provide a better 
vision than the outcome-centric method. For example, Beijing and Chongqing, with identical 
performances in the process, ended up diametric in their outcomes (Ghosts and Leaders 
respectively). In sum, both reiterate the notion that, that the outcome and process have not yet 
formed a causality or are connected in a weak linear relevance but have complex interconnectivity. 
This further underlines the need that the impact of social media on risk communication should 
and must be assessed through a combination of process and outcome, or interconnectivity. The 
dialogic theory posited that true connectivity requires the generation of mutuality (Kent & Taylor, 
2002). As such, we argued that analyzing the correlation of “speak to power” and “speak from 
power” can provide nuanced insights into the impact of social media on risk communication. For 
instance, Chongqing and Heilongjiang are at high levels in both dimensions. This suggested that 
the likely formation of government-public mutuality in that two provinces, which further implies 
a government-public dialogic relationship. On the other hand, if only one dimension of the 
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interconnectivity matrix is at a high level, it indicates that social media is majorly dominated by 
such dimensions. For instance, Beijing and Tianjin are located “speak from power” booster, which 
is high level in “speak from power” but the low level in “speak to power”, suggesting that the 
social media function is dominated by “speak from power” and the “speak to power” potential is 
not fully exploited. Similarly, seven provinces are located in the “speak to power” channel, which 
is high level in “speak to power” but the low level in “speak from power”, suggesting that the 
major function of social media is dominated by “speak to power” and the “speak from power 
potential is not fully exploited. These findings again corroborate our critique of existing research 
– a piecemeal, outcome-centric approach, rather than a systematic evaluation of risk 
communication, cannot readily shed light on the real situation.  
The findings set out here also reveal the effectiveness of dialogic theory in understanding the 
focal issue. Specifically, the arguments advocated by Kent (2017) that social media has so far 
proven a poor dialogic tool and Norris and Moon (2005) argument that social media remains 
mostly a one-way “speak from power” strategy is directly challenged by the evidence from the 
results. Analytics in the Covid-19 response suggested a mutuality between the “speak from power” 
and “speak to power” in two provinces during the risk communication. Further investigations are 
required as it is necessary to refine the framework for an empirical investigation into the 
interconnectivity. 
7. Conclusion 
We used the dialogic theory as a theoretical lens through which to examine government–
public interconnectivity to provide nuanced insights into the impact of social media on risk 
communication. Specifically, the interconnectivity matrix that integrates “speak from power” with 
“speak to power” is introduced and the impact is measured through the correlation of the levels in 
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the two dimensions. The framework is validated by investigating the Weibo accounts of 17 
provincial administrative units in China for risk communication during the Covid-19 response. 
The implications of this study are twofold. 
Theoretically, this study proposed a framework to provide a holistic view of dialogic theory, 
which is verified to provide nuanced insights on the impact of social media based risk 
communication. Specifically, instead of focusing on one side of the communication, we are 
looking at the interconnectivity between two parties. Drawing on dialogic theory, we have 
witnessed empirical evidence showing that dialogue could also exist in social media under certain 
conditions. In particular, two provinces have reached a mutuality high level in both “speak to 
power” and “speak from power”, showing signs of government-public interconnectivity. In 
relation to further development of dialogic theory, this study enriches the context of dialogic theory, 
explaining the relationship between organizations and the public and extending the scope of 
dialogic theory to risk communication, calling for follow-up efforts to better understand the 
interconnectivity of governments and the public. This will, in turn, promote theory development 
and empirical analysis. 
Practically, we performed a dialogic theory-based prototype framework to assess the 
government-public interconnectivity during the Covid-19 response and found that social media 
can not only be exploited to boost information dissemination, but also solicit public feedbacks and 
ultimately initiate interactive government-public dialogues. Particularly during emergency 
responses, informing the public with accurate information and appropriately engaging them is 
arguably an effective approach to reduce public anxiety and enhance government credibility. 
Specifically, administrators should exploit social media platforms to actively initialize “dialogue”, 
rapidly respond to public needs, and strategically adjust response intensity to enhance the 
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performance of risk communication. 
This study is not without its limitations. First, in addition to the main process and outcome 
phases, there are other influential factors (e.g., demographic information, pandemic information), 
which are not incorporated into our framework. This issue is likely to be addressed in future studies. 
Second, Covid-19 is a long-lasting crisis and the impact of social media on interconnectivity could 
be dynamic across different stages rather than static, which requires further investigation. Finally, 
although this study has acquired all the available Weibo data from provincial administrative units 
in China, it has been confronted with data limitations similar to those encountered by previous 
studies of social media data (e.g., Bertot et al. (2012); (Martí, Serrano-Estrada, & Nolasco-
Cirugeda, 2019)). Further work on this is therefore necessary, considering another scenario and 
adopting alternative data. In all, the study is not meant to present an all-in-one solution to address 
the above-mentioned challenges, but rather establish a starting point to develop a broader 
repertoire of strategies and exploit the benefit of social media in risk communication. 
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Province (Trillion yuan) Million %  
Beijing 3.61 21.54 86.60 >1000 km 
Tianjin 1.40 15.62 83.48 >1000 km 
Shanghai 3.87 24.28 88.30 <1000 km 
Chongqing 2.50 31.24 66.80 Adjacency 
Henan 5.50 96.40 53.21 Adjacency 
Hubei 4.34 59.27 61.00 N/A 
Jiangsu 10.27 80.70 70.61 Adjacency 
Jiangxi 2.57 46.67 57.42 Adjacency 
Jilin 1.23 26.90 58.27 >1000 km 
Heilongjiang 1.37 37.51 60.90 >1000 km 
Shanxi 1.77 37.29 59.55 <1000 km 
Shandong 7.31 100.70 61.51 <1000 km 
Qinghai 0.30 6.07 55.52 >1000 km 
Guangdong 11.08 115.21 71.40 <1000 km 
Guizhou 1.78 36.23 49.02 <1000 km 
Zhejiang 6.46 58.50 70.00 <1000 km 
Xinjiang 1.38 25.23 51.87 >1000 km 
Resource: The official website of the provincial statistics bureaus. 
 
